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Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 
On March 13, 2001, Utah State University ("USU") entered into a contract with 
Alpine Orthopedic Specialists, L.L.C., under which Alpine would provide athletic team 
physician services ("Alpine contract"). (R. 102-11.) The Alpine contract had a 5-year 
term that renewed automatically "unless otherwise agreed upon." (R. 104.) On April 13, 
2005, USU informed Alpine that USU had failed to comply with the Utah Procurement 
Code, Utah Code section 63-56-408,1 when it failed to request competitive proposals 
before entering into the Alpine contract. (R. 1078-79.) USU did not cancel the Alpine 
contract, but required that any renewal would be subject to Alpine's submitting the most 
competitive proposal. (R. 1079.) In 2006, both Alpine and Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. submitted proposals to provide team physician services, and USU awarded the 
contract to Intermountain. (R. 1079.) 
Alpine challenged USU's determination that to renew the Alpine contract USU 
had to request competitive proposals. (R. 1129.) USU rejected Alpine's challenge. 
Alpine did not appeal USU's final decision within the period specified in Utah Code 
section 63-56-817(1). (R. 1217-19.) Thus, Alpine is now bound by USU's determination 
that any contract for team physician services after April 2006 required competitive 
proposals under Utah Code section 63-56-408. 
At issue here are Alpine's claims against Intermountain for intentional interference 
with contract and economic relations, for which Alpine seeks damages stemming from 
the fact that USU did not allow the Alpine contract to renew automatically, but instead 
requested competitive proposals and ultimately awarded a new contract to Intermountain. 
1
 The applicable 2005 version of the Code is substantively the same as the 2010 version. 
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Alpine failed timely to appeal USU's decision to award the contract to Intermountain. 
Thus, Alpine does not, and now cannot, contend that, given the submitted proposals, 
Intermountain should not have been awarded the new contract. 
Issue 1: Whether Alpine's claims fail as a matter of law because they seek 
damages that Alpine failed to mitigate by appealing USU's decision to request 
competitive proposals for the position of team physician. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews the grant of summary judgment for 
correctness. Salt Lake County v. Hollidav Water Co., 2010 UT 45, f 14, 234 P.3d 1105. 
Alternative Grounds to Affirm: The court may affirm on "any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158. 
Alpine concedes that its claims for intentional inference with contract and 
intentional interference with economic relations involve "essentially the same elements." 
(AOB at 9.) Those elements include Intermountain's allegedly acting with an improper 
purpose or improper means to cause USU to request competitive proposals rather than 
allowing the Alpine contract to renew automatically. Yet USU's witnesses testified that 
they required competitive proposals, not because of anything Intermountain did, but 
because USU had concluded that the Alpine contract should have been subject to 
competitive proposals in 2001. In response, Alpine states only that the Alpine contract 
was procured lawfully, implying that USU was incorrect in its decision to require 
competitive proposals. (R. 1442.) But regardless of whether competitive proposals were 
required—which they were—Alpine's response does not dispute that USU's decision had 
nothing to do with Intermountain's alleged improper means or purpose. 
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Issue 2: Whether summary judgment is appropriate on claims of intentional 
inference with contract and economic relations where the moving party presents evidence 
that it played no role in the loss of contract and the nonmoving party does not dispute that 
fact. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews the grant of summary judgment for 
correctness. Salt Lake County v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, T| 14, 234 P.3d 1105. 
As an alternative, Alpine moved under Rule 56(f) for additional time to retain an 
expert before the court ruled on Intermountain9s motion for summary judgment. 
According to Alpine, its expert would provide an opinion concerning whether 
Intermountain violated some professional standard. Despite having had years to retain an 
expert, Alpine did not identify either an expert or any evidence possessed by 
Intermountain that Alpine's expert would need before he or she could provide such an 
opinion. 
Issue 3: Whether a district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for 
discovery under Rule 56(f) where the nonmoving party has in its possession the evidence 
it wishes to present in opposing summary judgment. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews the denial of a motion for discovery 
under Rule 56(f) for abuse of discretion. Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop., 
Inc., 2002 UT 39, H 16, 48 P.3d 910. 
Determinative Provisions 
Determinative provisions are attached at Addendum B. 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves Alpine's claims that Intermountain tortiously interfered with 
the Alpine contract. Alpine's alleged damages all stem from USU's decision to request 
competitive proposals under the Utah Procurement Code for the position of team 
physician instead of allowing the Alpine contract to renew automatically after its initial 
five-year term. 
This appeal involves whether Alpine's claims fail as a matter of law both because 
Alpine failed to appeal USU's determination that the position of team physician required 
competitive proposals and because there is no evidence that USU's decision to request 
competitive proposals was caused by Intermountain rather than USU's interpretation of 
the Utah Procurement Code. This appeal also involves whether the district court abused 
its discretion in denying a request for discovery under Rule 56(f) where the moving party, 
Alpine, possessed the "discovery" allegedly needed. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
Alpine's complaint alleges that Intermountain intentionally interfered with 
Alpine's economic relations and contracts. Alpine's claims are based upon its allegation 
that Intermountain induced USU to breach the Alpine contract by requesting competitive 
proposals for the position of team physician after the five-year term of the Alpine 
contract expired. (R. 254-57.) Alpine also alleges that USU breached the Alpine 
contract by requesting the same competitive proposals under the Utah Procurement Act. 
(R. 250-54.) 
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On April 9, 2009, the district court granted Alpine's motion for partial summary 
judgment declaring that the Alpine contract was enforceable because USU had "ratified 
and affirmed" the contract. (R. 1085.) But the court also ruled that ratification was 
necessary because USU had failed to comply with the Utah Procurement Code when it 
entered into the Alpine contract in 2001, meaning any contract involving team physician 
services requires competitive proposals. (R. 1083.) 
USU then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Alpine's 
claims directed at USU were untimely. (R. 1218.) Under Utah Code section 63-56-
815(1), a contractor may challenge a request for competitive proposals to provide the 
services it currently provides, but that contractor must challenge the request in district 
court either within 14 days of a final administrative decision or within 20 days of learning 
of the facts giving rise to the challenge. Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-817(1). The district 
court here ruled that Alpine's claim that USU had breached the Alpine contract by 
requesting competitive proposals was untimely because Alpine filed its complaint in this 
case well beyond both deadlines. (R. 1218.) 
The district court certified its order granting USU's motion for summary judgment 
as final under Rule 54(b). (R. 1523.) Alpine appealed, and that appeal is pending in this 
court with case number 20100275. 
Intermountain also filed a motion for summary judgment on three separate 
grounds. First, Intermountain argued that there was no evidence that its unsuccessful 
attempts in 2005 to recruit one of Alpine's doctors—Dr. Finnoff—caused Dr. Finnoff to 
leave Alpine for a job in Oregon in 2005. In support, Intermountain provided the sworn 
testimony of Dr. Finnoff himself, who testified that he did not believe Intermountain had 
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acted improperly and "did not interfere with his relationship with Alpine." (R. 1444.) In 
opposition, Alpine did not dispute those facts, but instead merely stated that Dr. Finnoff 
is not an expert on standards of professionalism and was unqualified to provide a legal 
conclusion. (R. 1444.) 
Second, Intermountain argued that there was no evidence that Intermountain's 
alleged improper means or purpose caused USU to request competitive proposals, but 
instead USU independently determined that competitive proposals were required under 
the Utah Procurement Code, a legal conclusion later confirmed by the district court. (R. 
1442.) Specifically, Dale Mildenberger, USU's head athletic trainer, testified that USU's 
motivations in requesting competitive proposals for team physician were that (i) USU 
should have requested competitive proposals before entering into the Alpine contract in 
2001, and (ii) USU wanted to ensure that it was not dependent upon a single physician. 
(R. 1442.) In response, Alpine did not provide evidence to dispute those facts, but 
instead stated only that the Alpine contract was bid lawfully in 2001, a fact that, if true, 
would not indicate that Intermountain improperly caused USU to believe otherwise. (R. 
1442.) 
Third, Intermountain argued that Alpine had failed to mitigate its damages by 
timely appealing USU's decision to request competitive proposals. (R. 1236.) Alpine's 
claimed damages fell into three categories, each of which allegedly resulted from the 
termination of the Alpine contract: (i) damage to Alpine's reputation and goodwill; 
(ii) Alpine's alleged loss of revenue because it no longer provides care to team members; 
(iii) Alpine's alleged loss of referrals from team members and physicians. (R. 1448-49.) 
In response, Alpine argued that it attempted to mitigate its damages by submitting a 
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proposal to continue as team physician, but Alpine did not dispute that it failed timely to 
appeal USU's decision that competitive proposals were required under Utah law. 
(R. 1450.) 
Alpine also filed a motion under Rule 56(f) requesting the opportunity to retain an 
expert and conduct additional discovery to assist its expert before responding to the 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 1446.) Alpine expressed its intent to hire an expert 
who would opine that Intermountain violated some unidentified professional standard in 
attempting (unsuccessfully) to recruit Dr. Finnoff. (R. 1446-47.) Alpine did not argue, 
and does not argue here, that it needed to "discover" any evidence that Alpine did not 
possess before its expert could formulate that opinion. 
The district court denied Alpine's request under Rule 56(f) on the ground that 
even if Alpine could retain an expert who might testify that Intermountain violated some 
professional standard, it would not preclude summary judgment. (R. 1524.) The court 
then granted the motion for summary judgment on numerous grounds: "Plaintiff has not 
set forth any specific facts showing that Intermountain intentionally interfered with 
Plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, that Intermountain acted with an 
improper purpose or by improper means, or that Intermountain caused any injury to 
Plaintiff." (R. 1524.) A copy of the court's order is at Addendum A. Alpine appealed. 
III. Statement of Facts 
On March 13, 2001, Alpine and USU entered into the Alpine contract, under 
which Alpine was to provide team physician services to USU athletes. (R. 1438.) The 
Alpine contract's initial term was for five years. (R. 1438.) 
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Dr. Finnoff 
Dr. Finnoff provided team physician services for Alpine from May 2001 to March 
2005 Dr. Finnoff testified that by 2005 he was dissatisfied with his work at Alpine 
because he was reqi lired to w ot k loi lg 1 101 irs ai id received ^ \ hat he :onsidet ed t : • be 
inadequate support and insufficient pay (R 1240 ) Dr. Finnoff terminated his 
emplo\ment w "lit Mpiru1 MI I^  latdi '00s* lo lake aposition in Bend, Oregon, with a clinic 
that was closely affiliated with the U.S. Ski Team. (R. 1240.) 
A year before Dr. Finnoff left for Oregon, Dr. Finnoff communicated with 
Intermountain about the possibility of ei i lployi i lei it at I ogan R egioi lal I lospital 
(R. 1443.) At that time, Dr. Finnoff knew "that there was a possibility that Alpine 
Ortl lopaedics i i ia;> i lot I: lave a coi iti act oi i, a 'permanent basis by virtue of his conversations 
with Mr. Mildenberger," USU's head athletic trainer (R. 1443.) Dr. Finnoff had two 
brief conversations with Intermountain's Jana Huffman. (R. 1443.) In those 
conversations, Ms. Huffman-said that, although Intermoi n itaii i did i lot 1 ia\ e tl ite USU 
team physician contract, if it came up for bid, Intermountain would bid on it. (R. 1241.) 
No oi le from Inten i IOI ii itaii l gi larai iteed or repi esented tl iat Ii item lountain woi lid be 
awarded that contract in the future. (R. 1241.) 
I . n;
 f termountain made an offer of employment to Dr. Finnoff. 
(R. 1443.) Dr. Finnoff declined the offer because, among other reasons, the proposed 
salary was inadequate, he was subject to a noncompete agreement with Alpine, and he 
and his wife d id nn| nanl f<> IIM" in 1 MI.NIM Inny, Www (K I M < '» 
Dr. Finnoff testified that he did not believe that Intermountain did anything 
improper in recmilmg him and did not interfere with his relationship with Alpine. 
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(R. 1444.) Dr. Finnoff explained his reasons for terminating his employment with Alpine 
as follows: "I didn't know if the contract with USU would stay [at Alpine], I had a good 
opportunity to work in a clinic [in Oregon] seeing the type of athletes that I was very 
interested in, they had a close affiliation with the U.S. ski team, and they were in a place 
we both liked, my wife did not like Logan, and I wouldn't have to work evenings and 
weekends, and the salary looked like it would be similar, competitive" with his salary at 
Alpine. (R. 1241.) Alpine did not dispute any of those facts concerning Dr. Finnoff in its 
summary judgment papers. (R. 1443-44.) 
USU's Reason for Requesting Competitive Proposals 
According to Dale Mildenberger, USU's head athletic trainer, USU's motivation 
for rebidding the team physician contract in the spring of 2006 was twofold: (i) the 
Alpine contract had not been bid lawfully in 2000; and (ii) USU needed to protect itself 
and not be dependent on any one individual physician. (R. 1442.) Alpine did not dispute 
in its summary judgment papers that Intermountain did not cause USU to believe 
competitive proposals were required or to request competitive proposals. 
Alpine's Failure to Appeal USU's Decision 
On February 17, 2006, USU issued a request for proposals for team physician 
services. (R. 1237.) On March 20, 2006, Alpine wrote to Bud Covington, USU's Chief 
Procurement Officer, asserting a right under the Alpine contract to continue as USU team 
physician for five more years and asking USU to clarify its rationale for issuing a request 
for competitive proposals. (R. 1237.) On March 22, 2006, USU's Athletic Director, 
Randy Spetman, responded to Alpine's letter, stating that USU would "continue to solicit 
proposals as initiated by its [request for proposals] and award a contract as outlined 
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therein ' ' (R 1 439 ) I Ie also advised \ Ipii ic tl lat tl ie..,,/ l lp ine conti act had expired on 
March 12, 2006. (R. 1439.) 
On March 30, 2006, Alpine wrote a letter to Mr. Covington "formally appeal [ling] 
the decision o f USU" to request competiti\ e proposals 1 11 idei tl ie I Itah Proci 11 ei nei it Code 
and requesting a "formal opinion" from USU. |R. 1237-38.) Acting as Chief 
Proci irement O n< •• - igton rejected Alpine's appeal on April 14, 2006, 
(R. 1439.) Mr. Covington advised Alpine that it had a right to judicial review of the 
decision as provided in the Utah Procurement Code. (R. 1439.) Mr. Covington's 
decision was hand-delivered lu^iipi \ * * ^ u 1 lot seek 
judicial review o f U S U ' s decision to request proposals. (R. 1440.) 
Alpine suhiiilfnf a piopos.il Ic 1 nnfifiae \mn id nig team physician services on 
March 28, 2006. (R. 1439.) By letter dated May 18, 2006, U S U advised Alpine that it 
had awarded the new contract to Intermountain (R 1 4 4 0 ) The major factors 
influencing U S U ' s awardof the contract to Intermounhnn \ u i e 11 if en uounl aim's detailed 
plan for multiple-site and multiple-event coverage, as well as its identification of the 
particular persoimr I n lm would pi oxide enieoijie (Is1 I I J 1" 1 Prion' to 1 IS I Ts issuance of 
the request for competitive proposals, Intermountain's only communications with U S U 
coiieeniinig the (earn physician contract consisted of its expressions o f interest in bidding 
for the contract should it come up for bid. (R. 1240.) 
Alpine did not seek timely judicial review of USU's decision to award the team 
physician contract to lei ei 1 1 i< n 1 1 1! i tii 1 (R I I K) ) Iiisl c ; id. VI{ »ii ie filec 1 tl lis h twsu.it on 
November 2, 2006—177 days after May 18, 2006—well outside the 20-day statute of 
l i i p i h i i m n s in 1 H a i t i o d e § 6 I V>-X I '( 'I I \H 1 M X | '"' '". 
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Summary of Argument 
Alpine's claims against Intermountain for intentional interference with contract 
and economic relations fail as a matter of law for at least three reasons. First, Alpine's 
claimed damages stem from USU's decisions to request competitive proposals and to 
award the contract to Intermountain. Yet Alpine did not timely appeal either decision. 
Thus, even if Alpine were correct that USU should not have requested competitive 
proposals, Alpine nonetheless failed to mitigate its damages by appealing USU's 
decisions within the time periods specified in Utah Code section 63-56-815(1). 
Second, Alpine provided no evidence that Intermountain improperly interfered 
with the Alpine contract. Alpine contends that USU had no legal basis for requiring 
competitive proposals. Again, even if that were correct, it does not indicate that 
Intermountain caused USU to conclude that competitive proposals were required. In 
addition, Alpine provided no evidence that Intermountain improperly interfered with 
Alpine's relationship with its team physician, Dr. Finnoff. Intermountain unsuccessfully 
recruited Dr. Finnoff in 2004, a year before Dr. Finnoff left Alpine for a position in Bend, 
Oregon. Dr. Finnoff testified that Intermountain not only did nothing improper, but also 
had nothing to do with his decision to take the position in Oregon. Because Alpine does 
not dispute those facts, Alpine's claims for intentional interference fail as a matter of law. 
Third, Alpine's proposed discovery with its motion under Rule 56(f) would have 
made no difference. Alpine wanted time to retain an expert to submit an opinion 
concerning whether Intermountain violated some professional standard in unsuccessfully 
attempting to hire Dr. Finnoff. Apart from never explaining why it needed additional 
time to retain an expert or what is needed to "discover" prior to such an expert's being 
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able to piu\ itfe n« opinion, llie espeil \ opinion would hnu1 been beside the point. There 
is no evidence linking Intermountain's unsuccessful attempt to hire Dr. Finnoff in 2004 
with USU's request for competitive proposals in 2006. This court should affirm. 
Argun 
I. Alpine's Claims Fail as a Matter of Law Because Alpine Failed to Mitigate 
Its Damages 
In response to Intermountain's inohon li»r summ.ii \ jttilgtik nl Alpine 'oneecled 
that its alleged damages stemmed only from the loss of the contract: "Alpine's claims 
involve nil) 1 IS I l[ s hi atlh Ml (In; .MHMI PSA |lhe Alpine contract] and Intermountain 
Healthcare's interference with the 2001 PSA." (k. 1439.) In the opening brief, Alpine 
confirms that its damages all stem from "Alpine losing the USU team physician services 
contract." (AOB at 12.) 
Yet Alpine does not claim that USU should not have awarded the contract to 
intHinoiiin fin fi\ i n the piopoMls (1S( I <u t u;tl I \ received, but ii istead argues that l ^TT 
should not have sought competitive proposals for the contract in the first place. (AOB at 
12.) 11 St J formally decided that issue on April 14, 2006, and Alpine never appealed that 
decision. Thus, assuming Alpine is correct in its argument before Id is eotirt—i.e., USU 
incorrectly decided that competitive proposals were required under the Utah Procurement 
Code—Alpine had <t means ol iivnulini' ih iitfun In linielv appealing USlTs ilei'ismn 
under the Utah Procurement Code. 
' I he I Itah I 'rocurei i lei it Code provides: "In the event of a timely protest under . 
Subsection . . . 63-56-815(l),[2] the state shall not proceed further will) the soliutiilioii or 
Utah Code section 63-56-815(l)(a) provides the district court jurisdiction over ai; 
between "the state" and a "contractor, prospective or actual, who is aggrieved in 
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with the award of the contract until all administrative and judicial remedies have been 
exhausted." Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-802. If Alpine had timely filed its action against 
USU under the Utah Procurement Code, USU would have been prevented from awarding 
the team physician contract to Intermountain until judicial resolution of Alpine's claims.3 
The status quo would have remained in effect, and Alpine would have suffered none of 
its alleged damages. Intermountain would not have become the provider of team 
physician services unless and until a court had determined that USU properly (i) refused 
to renew the Alpine contract and (ii) awarded the contract to Intermountain. In short, 
under Alpine's theories advanced in this lawsuit, Alpine would have suffered none of its 
claimed damaged had Alpine timely appealed USU's decisions. 
Under Utah law, Alpine had the duty to mitigate its damages. A plaintiff "may 
not, either by action or inaction, aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach." Utah 
Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1981); Reid v. Mut. of Omaha 
Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that mitigation of damages is 
connection with the solicitation or award of a contract." Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-
815(l)(a). Alpine is an actual contractor who claims to have been aggrieved by the 
request for proposals and award of the team physician contract to Intermountain. 
In fact, Alpine could have stayed USU's actions at the solicitation stage if it had sought 
judicial review of USU's decision to move forward with the request for proposals on 
April 14, 2006. Alpine had 14 days to appeal that ruling which would have prevented 
USU from moving forward with the request for proposals until a court determined that it 
was appropriate to do so. 
Now, however, Alpine's claims against USU are barred by the statute of limitations 
in Utah Code section 63-56-817(1), which gives an "aggrieved" party "20 calendar days" 
to initiate an action after it knows or should have known of the facts giving rise to the 
action. As the district court noted, Alpine knew or should have known of its claim by at 
least May 18, 2006 when it received notice that the team physician contract had been 
awarded to Intermountain. Alpine did not file its claim until November 2, 2006, well 
after the 20-day statute of limitations had run. 
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make "reasonable efforts and expenditures." Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., 743 P.2d 
1212, 1214 (Utah 1987) (recognizing that a plaintiff is not entitled to damages "which 
could have been avoided if the aggrieved party had acted in a reasonably diligent niiiiinn 
in attempting to lessen his losses as a consequence of that breach"). The duty to mitigate 
damages prevei its a plaii itiff fit: oi :t i recoverii ig "anj itei i i • ::)f dan lage arising fron i the 
wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or minimized by reasonable means." 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). 
As a matter of law, Alpine failed to mitigate its damages, and i( is now barred 
from any relief. This court should affirm on that alternative ground, a ground that is at 
issue in \ lpii le's separate appeal invoh ii ig USU, No 201002' 75. 
II. Alpine's Intentional Interference Claims Also Fail as a Matter of Law on 
Their Merits 
To succeed oi I its claii i is of ii itei itional ii tterferei ice w it! :t ecoi IOI nic relatioi is ai id 
intentional interference with contract, Alpine had to satisfy "essentially the same 
elements," ( v. 9 ^ Those elements are: (i) intentional interference with existing or 
potential economic relations; (ii) for an improper purpose or by improper means; 
(iii) causing injury. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 
1982). Here, Alpine provided no evidence (lull li)h'im<imit;iin u u i u d it <nn iii|inv <u 
acted with improper purpose or means. 
Causation 
Alpine presented no evidence that Intermountain interfered in any way with 
Alpine's relationships with Dr. Finnoff and USU. Based on the sworn testimony of the 
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people involved, Intermountain did not cause Dr. Finnoff to leave his employment with 
Alpine. Although Intermountain made an offer of employment to Dr. Finnoff, he rejected 
that offer because, among other reasons, the salary Intermountain offered was 
insufficient. Dr. Finnoff then waited a year before accepting a position in Oregon. Dr. 
Finnoff testified that Intermountain did nothing to interfere with his relationship with 
Alpine. Alpine did not dispute those facts in its summary judgment papers and provided 
no evidence to the contrary. A copy of Alpine's memorandum in opposition to 
Intermountain's motion for summary judgment is at Addendum C. It sets forth both 
Intermountain's statement of facts and Alpine's responses, which fail to dispute with 
admissible most of Intermountain's facts. 
Likewise, there is no evidence that Intermountain interfered with the relationship 
between Alpine and USU. USU representatives testified that USU made the decision to 
rebid the team physician contract for its own reasons. And Alpine never explains how 
Intermountain's failed effort to recruit Dr. Finnoff in the spring of 2004 could possibly 
have been the reason for USU's decision to request competitive proposals two years later. 
As Mr. Mildenberger testified, Intermountain was awarded the contract in 2006 because 
it offered a superior plan for coverage of USU athletic events and because it identified 
particular health care professionals as the people who would be responsible for the 
treatment of USU athletes. Alpine provided no evidence that Intermountain interfered 
with Alpine's contractual or economic relations. Without such evidence, Alpine's claims 
fail as a matter of law. 
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Improper Purpose 
In addition, there is no evidence that Intermountain had an improper piitpose. 
"Parties are not liable for intentional interference with economic relations unless they act 
with an improper pi lrpose orb) it iipi opei meai is " Imperial Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. v. 
Kelsch, 1998 Utah App. LEXIS 171, *3 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1998). Alpine alleges 
that Ii ltermoi u itain's effor be awarded the team physician contract and its recruitment 
of Dr. Finnoff were undertaken for the primary purpose of injuring Alpine, Biit 
"[competition is not an improper purpose." Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 
2008UT55,t iy, 1*. \6D6. A, !* • .if Hey, 
each offering orthopedic and related services to the public. Intermountain's desire to gain 
compelilive ad\,ml<ige OUM Alpine b) becoming the team physician for USU does not 
constitute an improper purpose. The improper purpose test is not applicable to 11:1te 
conduct of competitors in the marketplace who "struggle for personal advantage" and 
"inevitably damage one another." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 I"2d 293, 
307 (Utah 1982). For that reason, Alpine's claims fail as a matter of law. 
Instead. Alpim inthl piou that Intermountain's "predominant purpose was to 
injure plaintiff." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 201 
(Utah H ("recognizing that "spite and a desire to do harm to the plaintiff for its owi i 
sake" are required for an interference claim). There is no evidence (li;it InkTmuuiiliiin 
attempted to recruit Dr. Finnoff or to obtain the team physician contract for the primary 
purpose ol hurmi141 Alpim \n\ Immi suffered b\ Alpine was merely the byproduct of 
Intermountain's legitimate competitive activity to secure benefits for itself. Leigh 
Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307 ("legitimate long-range economic motivation" is not tortious 
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interference). There is no evidence that injury to Alpine was Intermountain's purpose, let 
alone its "predominant purpose/' as it must have been for Alpine's claim to succeed. 
Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, 2009 UT 49, If 36, 221 P.3d 205 ("recognizing that 
plaintiffs "conclusory assertion" about defendant's motivation was inadequate to support 
a claim for interference). Alpine's claims of tortious interference therefore fail as a 
matter of law for that additional reason. 
Improper Means 
"Improper means are present where the means . . . are contrary to law, such as 
violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common law rules." St. Benedict's, 811 
P.2d at 201. "Improper means include violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or 
misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood" 
or the violation of "an established standard of a trade or profession." Id There is no 
evidence that Intermountain did any of those. 
It was neither unlawful nor unethical for Intermountain to attempt to recruit 
Dr. Finnoff. In fact, over the last decade, Alpine successfully recruited a number of 
Intermountain physicians. Alpine's Rule 30(b)(6) witness testified that it is neither 
illegal nor improper for a hospital to recruit physicians from Alpine. (R. 1260.) 
Nor was it unlawful or unethical for Intermountain to offer to donate training room 
supplies to USU as part of its proposal for the team physician contract. As 
Intermountain's Ms. Huffman testified: "We tried to prepare a response that set us apart 
as a provider. One of the things that we felt like would set us apart would be the donation 
of supplies to Utah Sate University." (R. 1318.) The donation of supplies, like the 
recruitment of professionals, was a legitimate and completely ethical act of competition. 
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1 herefore \lpii :ie 1 ms provided, no evidence of either improper means or improper 
purpose. For that additional reason, Alpine 's claims fail as a mailer of law. 
III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Alpine's Request 
for Discovery Under Rule 56(f) 
Recognizing that it had insufficient evidence to oppose si n i n nary judgi i le t it, 
Alpine argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to provide Alpine 
additional tinIC* m i ondiiu discovery Npccificiilly, Alpine claims llial it needed 
additional t ime to retain an expert who then could provide an opinion that Intermountain 
breached soi tie professional standard by asking Dr. Finnoff whether he wanted to leave 
Alpine and join Intermountain, an invitation Dr. Finnoff declined (AOflal I ( 1'^  ) 
Alpine 's argument fails for three reasons. 
First, denial of a R \ lie 56(1 ) i i lotioi I is i lot at i abuse of discretioi i oi is per se 
harmless—where summary judgment is appropriate on a ground other than the subject of 
the h'miife %(f) motion. Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., !* - ,, • '\ ^ 1 (UtahCt . App. 
1992); American Towers Owners Ass 'n , Inc. v. CCI Mech., inc., yjU P.2d i i s i , 1195 
(Utah 1996); Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, t 38, 16 P.3d 540. Here, Dr. Finnoff 
testified that he left Alpine a year after Ii iteri I 101 in itaii I tried to i eci \ lit 1 nil t i foi reasons tt lat 
had nothing to do with Intermountain's offer of employment. Dr. Finnoff explained his 
reasons for tcfiiiiiiih.il iiit» IIP-< un^los unit! yulli Al|iuu as lollows:"T<i *:=. . know if the 
contract with USU would stay [at Alpine], I had a good opportunity to work in a clinic [in 
Oregon] seeing the type of athletes that I was very interested in, they had a close 
affiliation with the U.S. ski team, and they were in ;i pkuv \\r holh liked, tin w ife did not 
like Logan, and I wouldn ' t have to work evenings and weekends, and the salary looked 
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like it would be similar, competitive" with his salary at Alpine. (R. 1241.) Thus, even if 
Intermountain had violated some professional standard in attempting to recruit 
Dr. Finnoff, that violation had no causal relationship with Dr. Finnoff s departure. 
Second, Alpine's proposed expert opinion would have made no difference because 
the "professional standard" test has no application in the commercial setting. 
Intermountain has located no Utah cases holding that violation of a professional standard 
constitutes an improper means, let alone holding that violation of a professional standard 
in the commercial setting constitutes an improper means, as Alpine contends here. As 
Judge Posner has explained, "the established standards of a trade or profession in regard 
to competition, and its ideas of unethical competitive conduct, are likely to reflect a 
desire to limit competition for reasons related to the self-interest of the trade or profession 
rather than the welfare of its customers or clients." Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. ProServ, 
Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999). For that reason, "the tort of interference with 
business relationships should be confined to cases in which the defendant employed 
unlawful means to stiff a competitor." IcL Here, Alpine and Intermountain were 
competitors, and it is undisputed that Intermountain did nothing illegal. Therefore, even 
if Intermountain had violated some unspecified professional standard—which it did not— 
that violation would not save Alpine's intentional interference claims. 
Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for 
discovery under Rule 56(f) because Alpine did not explain why it should have taken 
Alpine three years to retain an expert and produce an expert opinion, nor did it identify 
any information its hypothetical expert would have needed had he or she been retained. 
In other words, Alpine did not request with its Rule 56(f) motion to discover evidence in 
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the control of Intermountain that Intermountain had refused to provide. Energy Mgmt. 
Servs., L.L.C. v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, f 12, 110 P.3d 158 (where other party controls 
the information, the party must request the information and that request must be denied). 
Nor did Alpine explain what information it needed, why it could not have discovered that 
information previously, or how that information would preclude summary judgment. 
Aspenwood, L.L.C. v. CAT. . L.L.C, 2003 UT App 28, ffif 19-23, 73 P.3d 947. 
Rule 56(f) provides relief to a party "[wjhen affidavits are unavailable" to oppose 
summary judgment based on the party's inability to complete fact discovery. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(f). Pursuant to that rule, "should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court.. . may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained." Id. To comply with Rule 56(f), the party must show that 
"facts essential to justify" its opposition are "within the other movant's exclusive 
knowledge or control," necessitating further time for discovery. Campbell Maack & 
Sessions v. Debrv, 2001 UT App 397, f 9, 38 P.3d 984. 
This case has been pending since November 2006, and Alpine first asserted claims 
against Intermountain in its amended complaint in July 2007. After nearly three years of 
fact discovery, Intermountain's production of hundreds of pages of documents, and 
numerous depositions, Alpine does not explain what discovery is lacking. Instead, all of 
the information Alpine's expert needs to form an opinion about a professional standard is, 
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and always has been, within Alpine's control Alpine provides no explanation why it 
waited three years to find an expert on what it has always claimed to be a key issue.4 
Rule 56(f) was not designed to protect a party from its own tardiness in selecting 
experts. It was designed rather to enable parties to complete fact discovery before having 
to respond to summary judgment motions. Alpine has had ample opportunity to secure 
an expert, provide him or her with pertinent factual material and obtain an affidavit in 
order to oppose summary judgment. Reeves v. Geigy Pharm., Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (denying Rule 56(f) request where counsel gave "no explanation . . 
. for her inability to obtain opposing affidavits during the lengthy period from the 
summer of 1985 through April 1986, after completion of the depositions and receipt of 
responses to interrogatories and requests for documents"); Debry, 2001 UT App 397, 
T| 12 (recognizing that where the "expert possessed sufficient information to form an 
opinion," a Rule 56(f) request seeking time to allow the expert to submit an affidavit 
should be denied). 
Moreover, it is doubtful that there is a qualified expert to express the opinion 
Alpine wants—that Intermountain's recruitment of Dr. Finnoff violated the established 
standards of the profession. Alpine's Rule 30(b)(6) witness testified as follows: "Q. Do 
you think it's improper for a hospital to recruit physicians from Alpine? A. No. Q. Do 
you think it's improper for Alpine to recruit physicians from a hospital? A. No." (R. 
4
 That issue—Dr. Finnoff s recruitment—has been known to Alpine at least since it filed 
its First Amended Complaint in July 2007. (R. 535 ("IHC, for an improper purpose and 
with improper means,.. . intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs existing and prospective 
economic relations, by and through its attempted recruitment of Dr. Jon Finnoff, during 
the time when Dr. Finnoff was an employee and business partner of Alpine O.S., and 
during the time when the Agreement was in full force and effect.").) 
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1260.) And there were an expert to provide such an opinion, Alpine had ample 
opportunity to obtain an affidavit from an expert before it submitted its opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment. Alpine cannot rely on Rule 56(f) to cure its failure to 
present a genuine issue of material fact to oppose summary judgment. 
Utah courts have repeatedly upheld the denial of Rule 56(f) motions under similar 
circumstances. For example, in Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debry, the court 
affirmed the trial court's denial of relief where the Rule 56(f) movant argued she had not 
yet retained an expert to analyze facts developed over years of discovery. In that case, as 
in this case, the Rule 56(f) movant had nearly three years to conduct discovery which 
"was more than adequate to uncover any available evidence that would support her . . . 
claim." 2001 UT App 397, fflf 11-14. And in that case, as here, the movant's Rule 56(f) 
affidavit failed to explain why she was unable to submit evidentiary affidavits in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. f^ 14. 
Likewise in Jensen v. Smith, 2007 UT App 152, 163 P. 3d 657, the court rejected 
a Rule 56(f) application by a party who professed to need more time to retain an expert to 
oppose a motion for summary judgment. Jensen held that two and a half years of 
discovery was ample for the Rule 56(f) movant to gather the facts and then retain and 
prepare an expert witness. Id. fflf 4-5. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in failing to allow Alpine to conduct "discovery" consisting of locating and obtaining an 
opinion from an expert it could have secured three years ago. This court should affirm. 
Conclusion 
This court should affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment on 
Alpine's claims against Intermountain. Alpine failed to mitigate its damages by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appealing the decisions made by USU that Alpine claims caused the damages it seeks 
here. Alpine also failed to provide any evidence that Intermountain had an improper 
purpose or acted through an improper means, let alone that anything Intermountain did 
caused USU to request competitive proposals for the position of team physician, the 
decision at the root of all of Alpine's alleged injuries. 
This court also should affirm the district court's denial of Alpine's request for 
additional discovery under Rule 56(f) because that rule is designed to allow a nonmoving 
party to obtain information it does not possess to oppose summary judgment, but it is not 
designed to provide a nonmoving party an extension to present evidence within its own 
control. Regardless, the proposed evidence here would have made no difference as a 
matter of law. This court should affirm. 
DATED this 11th day of April, 2011. 
SNELL & WILMERL.L.P. 
Alan LySullivan 
TroylxBooher 
Attorneys for Appellee Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. 
/^  /^  
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Health Care, Inc. 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALPINE ORTHOPAEDIC SPECIALISTS, 
L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY and 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, 
INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(f) MOTION 
Case No. 060102502 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
On August 18, 2010, the Court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment 
of defendant Intermountain Health Care, Inc. ("Intermountain") and the Rule 56(f) motion of 
plaintiff Alpine Orthopaedic Specialists, L.L.C. ("Plaintiff). Katherine A. Carreau of Snell & 
Wilmer L.L.P. appeared on behalf of Intermountain, and R Blake Hamilton of Stirba & 
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Associates appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Based upon the supporting and opposing memoranda 
and exhibits thereto, the argument of counsel, and the record in this matter, and for good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
1. Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion is DENIED. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any 
specific fact demonstrating that Intermountain intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs existing or 
potential economic relations or that Intermountain caused an injury to Plaintiff. Permitting 
Plaintiff more time under Rule 56(f) to engage an expert to opine on what would be proper or 
improper in business recruiting would not create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) request relates to only one element of the claims against Intermountain and 
would not create a genuine issue of material fact for trial with regard to the other elements of 
Plaintiff s claims. 
2. Intermountain's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and all claims 
against Intermountain Health Care, Inc. are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to Rule 
56, to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiff was required to set forth facts to show there is a 
genuine issue of disputed material fact for trial. Plaintiff has not set forth any specific facts 
showing that Intermountain intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs existing or potential 
economic relations, that Intermountain acted with an improper purpose or by improper means, or 
that Intermountain caused any injury to Plaintiff. 
11895772 2 
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On January 29, 2010, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Utah State 
University on all claims against it. This order adjudicates all remaining claims in this case and as 
such constitutes the final order and judgment in this case. 
DATED th i s^Q day of <RfjPy , 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ CUNT s. JUDKIN3 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins 
Judge, First Judicial District Court 
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LexisNexis® 
1 of 2 DOCUMENTS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2006 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** ARCHIVE DATA *** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2006 UT 7, 2006 UT APP 33 *** 
*** FEBRUARY 9, 2006(FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 56. UTAH PROCUREMENT CODE 
PART 4. SOURCE SELECTIONS AND CONTRACT FORMATION 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-408 (2005) 
§ 63-56-408. Use of competitive sealed proposals in lieu of bids - Procedure 
(1) (a) When, according to rules established by the Procurement Policy Board, the chief procurement officer, the head 
of a purchasing agency, or a designee of either officer above the level of procurement officer determines in writing that 
the use of competitive sealed bidding is either not practicable or not advantageous to the state, a contract may be entered 
into by competitive sealed proposals. 
(b) (i) Competitive sealed proposals may be used for the procurement of services of consultants, professionals, 
and providers as defined by the policy board by rule, whether or not the determination described in this subsection has 
been made. 
(ii) The policy board shall make rules establishing guidelines to assure maximum practicable competition in 
those procurements, including the relative importance, if any, of the fee to be charged by an offeror. 
(iii) The rules may provide that it is either not practicable or not advantageous to the state to procure certain 
types of supplies, services, or construction by competitive sealed bidding or competitive sealed proposals. 
(2) (a) Proposals shall be solicited through a request for proposals. 
(b) Public notice of the request for proposals shall be given in accordance with policy board rules. 
(3) (a) Proposals shall be opened so as to avoid disclosure of contents to competing offerors during the process of 
negotiation. 
(b) A register of proposals shall be prepared in accordance with policy board rules and shall be open for public 
inspection after the contract is awarded. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-408 
Page 2 
(4) The request for proposals shall state the relative importance of price and other evaluating factors. 
(5) (a) As provided in the request for proposals and under policy board rules, discussions may be conducted with 
responsible offerors who submit proposals for the purpose of assuring full understanding of, and responsiveness to, 
solicitation requirements. 
(b) Offerors shall be accorded fair and equal treatment with respect to any opportunity for discussion and revision 
of proposals, and revisions may be permitted after submissions and before the contract is awarded for the purpose of 
obtaining best and final offers. 
(c) In conducting discussions, there shall be no disclosure of any information derived from proposals submitted 
by competing offerors. 
(6) (a) Award shall be made to the responsible offeror whose proposal is determined in writing to be the most 
advantageous to the state, taking into consideration price and the evaluation factors set forth in the request for proposals. 
(b) No other factors or criteria shall be used in the evaluation. 
(c) The contract file shall contain the basis on which the award is made. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,63-56-21, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 75, § 1; 1983, ch. 299, § 1; 1993, ch. 232, § 9; renumbered by 
L. 2005, ch. 25, § 39. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2005 amendment, effective May 2,2005, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 63-56-21. 
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TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 56. UTAH PROCUREMENT CODE 
PART 8. LEGAL AND CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-802 (2005) 
§ 63-56-802. Effect of timely protest 
In the event of a timely protest under Subsection 63-56-801(1), 63-56-810(1), or 63-56-815(1), the state shall not 
proceed further with the solicitation or with the award of the contract until all administrative and judicial remedies have 
been exhausted or until the chief procurement officer, after consultation with the head of the using agency or the head of 
a purchasing agency, makes a written determination that the award of the contract without delay is necessary to protect 
substantial interests of the state. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 63-56-46, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 75, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 126; renumbered by L. 2005, ch. 25, § 
71. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 63-56-46, and updated references. 
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TITLE 63. STATE AFEAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 56. UTAH PROCUREMENT CODE 
PART 8. LEGAL AND CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-815 (2005) 
§63-56-815. Jurisdiction of district court 
(1) The district court shall have jurisdiction over an action, whether the action is at law or in equity, between the state 
and: 
(a) a bidder, offeror, or contractor, prospective or actual, who is aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or 
award of a contract; 
(b) a person who is subject to a suspension or debarment proceeding; and 
(c) a contractor, for any cause of action which arises under, or by virtue of a contract. 
(2) The provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30d, Part 4, Notice of Claim Against a Governmental Entity or a 
Government Employee, and Section 63-30d-601 do not apply to actions brought under this chapter by an aggrieved 
party for equitable relief or reasonable costs incurred in preparing or appealing an unsuccessful bid or offer. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 63-56-59, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 75, § 1; 2002, ch. 178, § 3; 2004, ch. 267, § 37; renumbered by 
L. 2005, ch. 25, § 84. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2002 amendment, effective May 6,2002, substituted the current statutory 
references for "63-30-2 through 63-30-19" and added the language beginning "by an aggrieved party" at the end of 
Subsection (2) and made a stylistic change. 
The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, in Subsection (2), substituted the language beginning "Title 63, Chapter 
30d" and ending "Section 63-30d-601" for "Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, and 63-30-19." 
The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 63-56-59. 
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TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 56. UTAH PROCUREMENT CODE 
PART 8. LEGAL AND CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-817 (2005) 
§63-56-817. Statutes of limitations 
(1) Any action under Subsection 63-56-815(l)(a) shall be initiated as follows: 
(a) within 20 calendar days after the aggrieved person knows or should have known of the facts giving rise to the 
action; provided, however, that an action with respect to an'invitation for bids or request for proposals shall be initiated 
prior to the opening of bids or the closing date for proposals unless the aggrieved person did not know and should not 
have known of the facts giving rise to the action prior to bid opening or the closing date for proposals; or 
(b) within 14 calendar days after receipt of a final administrative decision pursuant to either Section 63-56-806 or 
Section 63-56-813, whichever is applicable. 
(2) Any action under Subsection 63-56-815(l)(b) shall be commenced within six months after receipt of a final 
administrative decision pursuant to Section 63-56-806 or Section 63-56-813, whichever is applicable. 
(3) The statutory limitations on an action between private persons on a contract or for breach of contract shall apply 
to any action commenced pursuant to Subsection 63-56-815(1 )(c), except notice of appeals from the Procurement 
Appeals Board pursuant to Section 63-56-814 concerning actions on a contract or for breach of contract shall be filed 
within one year after the date of the Procurement Appeals Board decision. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 63-56-61, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 75, § 1; 1981, ch. 259, § 6; renumbered by L. 2005, ch. 25, § 
86. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2005 amendment, effective May 2,2005, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 63-56-61, and updated references throughout the section. 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at 
any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by 
the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, 
may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the 
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall If practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material 
facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further 
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall 
be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a 
party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable 
expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be 
adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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Plaintiff, Alpine Orthopaedic Specialists, L.L.C. ("Alpine"), by and through undersigned 
counsel of record, and pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and 7, hereby submits this Joint 
Memorandum in Support of Rule 56(f) Motion and Opposition to Intermountain Healthcare, Inc 
("IHC") Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN DISPUTE1 
Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Alpine disputes the following facts from IHCs Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
1. Alpine and USU entered into the Personal Services Agreement on March 13, 
2001. Under that Agreement, Alpine was to provide team physician services to USU athletes. 
First Amended Complaint at f 8. The initial term of the Personal Services Agreement was for 
five years, and it expired in March 2006. Personal Services Agreement (Exhibit A to IHCs 
Memorandum) at % 3.1; Deposition of Robert Lee Doty (August 10, 2009) ("Doty Dep.") at 45. 
(Excerpts of Dr. Doty's deposition are collected in Exhibit B to IHCs Memorandum.) 
Response: Alpine had a valid contract with USU; assured USU that it would continue 
to provide services according to the terms of the contract; and, the contract was to renew and 
expire in March 2011. (April 9, 2009 Mem. Decision.) 
1
 IHC' s statement of factsincludes a number of irrelevant inadmi^H 
details. However, except as described below, Alpine does not contest those facts for purposes 
of this Motion only. Alpine reserves the right to contest all of IHCs assertions of fact in 
the future. 
2 
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4. On March 22, 2006, USU's Athletic Director, Randy Spetman, responded to 
Alpine's March 20 letter stating that USU would "continue to solicit proposals as initiated by its 
... RFP and award a contract as outlined therein." He also advised Alpine that the Personal 
Services Agreement had terminated on March 12, 2006. First Amended Complaint at f 12. 
Response: The PSA did not terminate on March 12, 2006. The PSA contains an 
automatic renewal provision, and thus does not terminate until March of 2011. This Court has 
determined that the PSA is binding and enforceable. (April 9, 2009 Mem. Decision.) 
5. Alpine responded to the RFP with a proposal on March 28,2006. Covington 
Dep. at 118 and Ex. 18 thereto. 
Response: Alpine attempted only to legally mitigate damages associated with USU's 
breach of the PSA and, therefore, responded to the 2006 RFP. Alpine's claims involve only 
USU's breach of the 2001 PSA and Intermountain Healthcare's interference with the 2001 PSA. 
(PL First Am. CompL; April 9, 2009 Mem. Decision.) 
7. Acting as Chief Procurement Officer for USU, Mr. Covington rejected Alpine's 
appeal on April 14, 2006. Mr. Covington held that the Personal Services Agreement was issued 
in violation of the Utah Procurement Code. He advised Alpine that it had a right to judicial 
review of the decision as provided in the Code. Mr. Covington's decision was hand-delivered to 
Alpine on April 14, 2006. Nelson Dep. at 151 and Ex. 29 thereto; Covington Dep. at 92 and Ex. 
l^'thereto7 
3 
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Response: Alpine denies that a valid sole source determination had not been made 
when the PSA was executed. This Court held that the Defendant's sole source determination 
was ratified properly under the UPC and, therefore, all provisions of the PSA are valid and 
binding, including the automatic renewal provision. {See April 9,2009, Mem. Decision.) 
8. Alpine did not seek judicial review of USU'S decision to solicit proposals. 
Response: The March 2001 PSA is a binding contract. (April 9,2009 Mem. 
Decision.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-6-815 and 63G-6-817(3), as a contractor, any 
cause of action Alpine has that arises under, or by virtue of, a contract is subject to a six year 
statute of limitations. Accordingly, Alpine did not need to seek judicial review within 14 days, 
and any characterization otherwise is legally flawed. 
9. By a letter dated May 18,2006, USU advised Alpine that it had awarded the new 
team physician contract to IHC. First Amended Complaint at f 68. 
Response: The March 2001 PSA is a binding contract. (April 9, 2009 Mem. 
Decision.) Awarding any contract for team physician services to IHC was done in breach of the 
March 2001 PSA. 
10. Alpine did not seek judicial review of USU's decision to award the team 
physician contract to IHC. Order Granting Defendant Utah State University's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (January 29, 2010). 
~"R^^^ 
Decision.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-6-815 and 63G-6-817(3), as a contractor, any 
4 
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cause of action Alpine has that arises under, or by virtue of, a contract is subject to a six year 
statute of limitations. Accordingly, Alpine did not need to seek judicial review within 14 days, 
and any characterization otherwise is legally flawed. 
11. Alpine filed this lawsuit on November 2, 2006,177 days after May 18,2006 and 
well outside the 20-day statue of limitations in Utah Code § 63G-6-817(l). 
Response: The March 2001 PSA is a binding contract. (April 9, 2009 Mem. 
Decision.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-6-815 and 63G-6-817(3), as a contractor, any 
cause of action Alpine has that arises under, or by virtue of, a contract is subject to a six year 
statute of limitations. Accordingly, Alpine was well within the relevant statute of limitations. 
15. IHC never saw or had knowledge of the terms of the Personal Service Agreement 
prior to this litigation. Deposition of Teri Chase-Dunn (October 1, 2009) ("Chase-Dunn Dep.") 
at 73-74. (Excerpts of Ms. Chase-Dunn's deposition are collected in Exhibit 6 to IHC's 
Memorandum.) See also Deposition of Jana Huffman (October 1, 2009) ("Huffman Dep.") at 
38. (Excerpts of Ms. Huffman's deposition are collected in Exhibit 7 to IHC's Memorandum.) 
Response: This statement is clearly untrue. In 2001, Alpine and IHC entered into a 
Letter of Agreement so that Alpine could present a proposal to USU. The Letter of Agreement 
stated that Alpine would provide a sports medicine physician, and that IHC would provide 
student health and other services. Further, IHC's Request for Provider ("RFP") for 2006 was 
prepared in 2005. According to the RFP, IHC knew that Alpine" had thecontractr 
5 
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the contract was five years and would be bid in the spring of 2006. (A true and correct copy of 
the 2006 RFP is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") 
16. According to Dale Mildenberger, USU's head athletic trainer, the University's 
motivation for re-bidding the team physician contract in the spring of 2006 was twofold: (a) the 
Personal Services Agreement had not been bid lawfully in 2000; and, (b) USU needed to protect 
itself and not be dependent on any one individual physician. Deposition of Dale Mildenberger 
(April 16,2007) ("Mildenberger Dep.") at 138-40. (Excerpts of Mr. Mildenberger's deposition 
are collected in Exhibit 8 to IHC's Memorandum.) 
Response: The Personal Services Agreement was bid lawfully in 2000. (April 9, 
2009 Mem. Decision.) 
17. As a result of the RFP process, IHC was awarded the team physician contract. 
Response: The March 2001 PSA is a binding contract. (April 9,2009 Mem. 
Decision.) Awarding any contract for team physician services to IHC was done in breach of the 
March 2001 PSA. 
18. The major factors influencing USU's award of the team physician contract to IHC 
were IHC's detailed plan for multiple-site, multiple-event coverage. Mildenberger Dep. at 194. 
Response: The Salt Lake Tribune reported that the major factors influencing USU's 
award of the team physician contract to IHC were "a number of extras, including $59,000 in 
physical therapy equipment, $100,660 in bandages, wraps, and other supplies" 
6 
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institution we couldn't simply ignore the donation of equipment and supplies...." (A true and 
correct copy of the November 3, 2006 article is attached hereto as Exhibit "B") 
23. A year before, in the spring of 2004, Dr. Finnoff communicated with IHC about 
the possibility of employment at Logan Regional Hospital. These communications consisted of 
two brief conversations with Jana Huffman. Finnoff Dep. at 102-05; Huffman Dep. at 67. At 
the time, Dr. Finnoff knew "that there was a possibility that Alpine Orthopaedics may not have a 
contract on a permanent basis by virtue of his conversations with Mr. Mildenberger. Finnoff 
Dep. at 62. 
Response: IHC knew that USU was very happy with its team physician services 
when Alpine was providing the services and that USU was not likely to change providers. IHC 
wanted to hire Dr. Finoff in an effort to obtain the USU team services contract. Deposition of 
Jonathan Finoff at 63, attached hereto as Exhibit "C". 
25. In the spring of 2004, IHC made an offer of employment to Dr. Finnoff. Dr. 
Finnoff declined the offer because, among other reasons, the proposed salary was inadequate, he 
was subject to a non-compete agreement with Alpine, and he and his wife did not want to live in 
Logan long-term. Finnoff Dep. at 64. 
Response: IHC wanted to see Dr. Finoff s employment contract with Alpine to 
determine if there was a way to break the contract in order to have Dr. Finoff work with IHC. 
Finoff Dep. at 65. " " 
7 
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26. Dr. Finnoff testified that he did not believe that it was improper for IHC to recruit 
him. FinnoffDep. at 116. 
Response: Dr. Finoff is not an expert on the standards of professionalism within the 
medical community and, therefore, is not qualified to give an opinion on whether IHC's conduct 
was improper. Improper is a term with legal significance in this case, and Dr. Finoff is 
unqualified to give an opinion stating a legal conclusion. 
27. Dr. Finnoff testified that IHC did not interfere with his relationship with Alpine. 
FinnoffDep. at 71. 
Response: Dr. Finoff is not an expert on the standards of professionalism within the 
medical community and, therefore, is not qualified to give an opinion on whether IHC's conduct 
interfered. Interfere is a term with legal significance in this case, and Dr. Finoff is unqualified to 
give an opinion stating a legal conclusion. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The civil rule governing summary judgment provides, in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
„ _ Whm_reviewi^ 
possible, the trial court view the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, 
8 
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345 (Utah 2000). See also Lack v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah App. 1987) ("In 
considering a summary judgment motion, the court must evaluate all the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment."). The Court may not grant a motion for summary judgment 
unless "it is clear from the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail." Lach, 746 
P.2d at 804. (citing Frisbee v. K & K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984)). "A genuine 
issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on 
whether defendant's conduct measures up to the required standard." Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 
613, 615 (Utah, 1982) (citing Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967)). 
Further, the nonmoving party can petition the court to deny or continue the motion for 
summary judgment in order to discover facts essential to the claims. "Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
ARGUMENT 
In this case, it is necessary to prove that IHC acted with improper means or purpose, 
which can be established by showing that IHCs means violated established professional 
standards of the medical profession? 6 ^ 92~P.3d~858, ~~~ 
9 
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864 (Utah 2008). Alpine anticipates obtaining expert reports to show that IHC's means in this 
case violated accepted standards of the profession. 
"Rule 56(f) motions opposing a summary judgment motion on the ground that discovery 
has not been completed should be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in 
merit.'5 Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Co-op., 48 P.3d 910, 917 (Utah 2002). Alpine's 
Motion in the present case should be granted since it is neither "dilatory" nor "lacking in merit." 
A party's Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance is not dilatory if the party has (1) already 
initiated discovery proceedings, (2) diligently seeks access to information that is within the sole 
control of the adverse party, and (3) is denied an adequate opportunity to conduct the desired 
discovery. Id. In this case, Alpine has been diligent in initiating and responding to discovery 
proceedings. On June 1, 2010, this Court granted Alpine's motion for enlargement of time 
extending the deadlines on the current scheduling order. The parties have submitted an 
Amended Scheduling Order stating that Alpine's expert reports are to be filed 30 days after the 
Court's decision on this motion. The deadline for expert reports has not passed and, therefore, 
Alpine has not delayed in conducting discovery or neglected its discovery duties. Alpine has 
sought this information diligently and the information reviewed by the expert has been in IHC's 
possession. Should this Court grant this Motion, Alpine would be denied an adequate 
opportunity to pursue discovery that would allow Alpine to prove essential elements of its claim; 
namely the standards of professional conduct and whether they were breached. 
10 
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A Rule 56(f) motion has merit when it targets core issues that might defeat the pending 
summary judgment motion. Id. A core issue in this case is whether IHC violated professional 
standards and intentionally interfered with economic relations and contract. Professional opinion 
is needed to determine the proper professional standards and whether those standards were 
violated. Expert testimony in this area would create a material issue of fact sufficient to survive 
a motion for summary judgment and would likely allow Alpine to prevail at trial. Since the 
expert testimony might defeat the pending summary judgment motion, Alpine's Rule 56(f) 
motion has merit and should be granted. 
Alpine alleges two claims against IHC — intentional interference with economic relations 
and intentional interference with contract. Alpine must prove essentially the same elements for 
both of these claims. St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 
1991) (recognizing that the tort of intentional interference with economic relations "protects both 
existing contractual relationships and prospective relationships of economic advantage not yet 
reduced to a formal contract.") Thus, Alpine must show that "(1) that [IHC] intentionally 
interfered with [Alpine's] existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose 
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to [Alpine]." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). Here, it is clear that IHC intentionally interfered with Alpine's 
existing or potential economic relations by and through its attempted recruitment of Dr. John 
Finnoff during the time when~Dr. Filmoff was a n ^ 
and during the time when the Agreement was in full force and effect. It is also clear that IHC's 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intentional interference injured Alpine. Furthermore, through future expert witness testimony, 
Alpine will be able to establish that IHC acted with an improper means or purpose. 
L IHC Intentionally Interfered With Alpine And IHC's Intentional 
Interference Injured Alpine. 
In this case, it is clear that IHC intentionally interfered with Alpine's existing or potential 
economic relations by and through its attempted recruitment of Dr. John Finnoff during the time 
when Dr. Finnoff was an employee and business partner of Alpine O.S., and during the time 
when the Agreement was in full force and effect. IHC recruited Dr. Finoff and attempted to lure 
him away from Alpine. IHC even offered to look at Dr. Finoff s employment contract with 
Alpine to see if it could help him break his contract. IHC recruited Dr. Finoff when he was 
employed at Alpine and working as the team physician for USU. IHC wanted to hire Dr. Finoff 
in an attempt to secure the USU team physician services contract. 
In Leigh, the court determined that driving away existing or potential customers is "the 
archetypal injury that this cause of action was devised to remedy." 657 P.2d at 306. IHC's 
intentional interference with Dr. Finoff injured Alpine because it led to Dr. Finoff leaving Alpine 
and to Alpine losing the USU team physician services contract. Furthermore, USU is beloved in 
the community and the team physician is a high profile position. The contract is desirable 
because it brings in more patients by referral and reputation. Alpine has been harmed 
economically by^heloss^ Alpine.has been injured, ..„ 
not only by the loss of money from USU directly, but also by the referrals and reputation that 
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comes through being the team physician. See Affidavit of Derk G Rasmussen Dated June 8, 
2010, attached as Exhibit "D" hereto. 
II. Alpine Will Be Able to Establish Through Expert Witness Testimony That 
IHC Violated An Established Standard Of Profession And, Thus, Acted With 
Improper Means Or Purpose. 
Improper means or purpose is defined as "means used to interfere with a party's 
economic relations [that] are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations or 
recognized common law rules. Improper means include violence, threats or other intimidation, 
deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation or disparaging falsehood. 
Means may also be improper or wrongful because they violate an established standard of trade or 
profession." Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858, 864 (Utah 2008). In this 
case, Alpine anticipates that through expert witness testimony, it will be able to establish that 
IHC violated an established standard of profession and, thus, acted with improper means or 
purpose. (Affidavit of R. Blake Hamilton attached hereto as Exhibit "E" ) 
III, Alpine Has Attempted To Mitigate Damages, 
Mitigation of damages is intended to "prevent one against whom a wrong has been 
committed from recovering any item of damage arising from the wrongful conduct which could 
have been avoided or minimized by reasonable means." Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of 
Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). However, the burden of proving plaintiff has not 
m i t i p ^ 
John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
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In this action, IHC cannot meet its burden of proving that Alpine failed to mitigate its 
damages. Alpine attempted to mitigate damages by submitting a proposal to USU's RPP, even 
though Alpine was under no obligation to do so, and let USU know of this position. Regardless, 
USU unlawfully breached its contract with Alpine by failing to honor the automatic renewal 
provision. Alpine attempted to mitigate the damages caused by USU's breach by submitting a 
proposal to the new RFP. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Alpine respectfully requests this Court deny IHC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
DATED this 0 day of June 2010. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
By: " ^ U U -^JUJJL 
PETER STIRBA 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the t^  day of June, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing ALPINE'S JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RULE 
56(F) MOTION AND OPPOSITION TO INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE, ING'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Robert D. Barclay 
Assistant Attorney General 
155 Old Main, Utah State University 
Logan, Utah 84322-1465 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Email 
Alan Sullivan 
Katie Carreau 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Email 
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